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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the impact of airline franchising on levels of air
service provision in the Highlands and Islands of Scotland. Results showed that
while air carriers operating under franchise agreements were offering reduced levels
of capacity, they were able, assisted by a more suitable mix of aircraft, to deliver
significant service improvements. These improvements were manifested in the
scheduling of more convenient flight times, a higher proportion of direct services
and the introduction of new routes. Compared to the previous incumbent, franchised
operators were also better able at managing capacity in relation to demand with
increased load factors reported after 1993. The implications of these results is that
little evidence could be identified of any substantial deterioration in service levels as
a consequence of franchising.
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Introduction
The economic and social development of peripheral regions is highly dependant on
the provision of adequate and easily affordable transportation services. In some
regions of world, because of geographic location, climate and physical terrain, air
transport is the only viable means of transportation for both goods and people.
Peripheral regions have two key features: low population densities and a lack of
proximity to major economic and political centres. Motivated primarily by the
political necessity to maintain cohesion within national jurisdictions, special
arrangements are usually made with regard to the provision of air services to and
within these regions. The high costs associated with providing these services
coupled with the need to maintain and operate airport infrastructure to serve small
communities, means that subsidy, in the form of grants from both national, regional
and local levels of government, is normally required to sustain a satisfactory level of
air service provision.
Methods of paying subsidy and the sources of funding vary by country. For
example, in the United States, there exists a comprehensive system of subsidies
organised within an Essential Air Services Programme. This was established in
response to concerns regarding the future viability of air services to small
communities as a result of deregulation within the domestic airline market.
3Research undertaken during the late nineteen eighties and early nineteen nineties
appears to validate these concerns.
Policy-makers in the European Commission, in formulating legislation to liberalise
air services, implicitly recognised the possible risks to the future viability of air
services to peripheral communities with provisions for the imposition of Public
Service Obligations (Commission of the European Communities, 1992). These
provisions grant national governments of member states the authority to protect and
subsidise routes that are of vital socio-economic importance. Levels of subsidy and
decisions on which routes qualify for PSO-status are left to the discretion of each
member state. According to Reynolds-Feighan (1995), it is because of this that
significant regional distortions exist in the quality and availability of air services to
and within Europe’s remote regions. For example, in France, approximately eighty
domestic routes have public service obligations imposed on them. In Scotland, on
the other hand, public service obligations are imposed on a limited number of ultra-
peripheral routes.
Public service obligations, supported by subsidy, can guarantee for a fixed period of
time, continuity of air services and low fares on routes linking peripheral regions
with hub airports. In the absence of public service obligations, these markets are
subject to shifting airline strategic priorities in response to developments in global
markets. Such a shift in priorities can be manifested in increased management focus
on providing services on high-density profitable networks while simultaneously
rationalising service levels and delivery on costly and generally lower margin
regional air service networks. Rationalisation can be achieved through franchising,
where major airlines sub-contract unprofitable segments of their networks to
4dedicated regional carriers. However, franchising also allows an airline to retain the
presence of its brand in a franchised market. (Denton and Denis, 2000). Air
services that are of vital socio-economic importance to communities located in
peripheral regions, without regulatory protection, are therefore vulnerable to changes
in levels of provision as a consequence of these developments.
Between 1994 and 1996, as a result of sustained losses incurred from directly
operating air services in the Highlands and Islands of Scotland, British Airways
decided to franchise its operations to two UK-based regional carriers. It is within
this context that the aim of this paper is to identify and evaluate whether there have
been any significant changes to the level of air service provision in the Highlands
and Islands as a consequence of air service franchising.
The structure of this paper is laid out as follows. The following section provides a
summary of the socio-economic characteristics of the Highlands and Islands region,
a brief history of air service provision and the current regulatory framework within
which these services are operated. The second section will examine past literature
on the subject of air service provision to peripheral regions and franchising, with
particular focus on the experience of small communities in the United States
following domestic air services deregulation in 1978. In the third section, the
methodology, research approach and sources of data will be specified. The
following section will evaluate the results, explaining any noticeable trends and
developments. The final section presents the conclusions of this paper.
5Air Transport in the Highlands and Islands
Socio-economic environment
The Scottish Highlands and Islands accounts for 13% of the land area of the British
Isles. A sizeable proportion of this area consists of islands and mainland
communities located at a significant distance from key political and economic
decision-making centres in both the United Kingdom and wider European Union.
The population of the Highlands and Islands, according to the latest statistics is
373,000, with 61% living in settlements of less than 5,000 inhabitants (Highlands
and Islands Enterprise, 2002). Table 3 provides population statistics for a number of
Scottish islands between 1981 and 2000. It is apparent from these statistics that all
of the island communities listed, with the exception of Orkney, have experienced a
decline in population between 1981 and 2000. For example, Islay’s population has
declined by 14% over the entire period while on the larger island of Lewis and
Harris, population has fallen by 8%. Worryingly, from an economic development
perspective, the General Register of Scotland predicts a 13% decline in the
population of the Western Isles between 2000 and 2016 (Western Isles, 2002).
The Highlands and Islands region is highly dependent on air travel where climatic
conditions and topography can make direct surface routes torturous and inconvenient
where sea fogs, high winds and heavy precipitation impacts on the punctuality and
regularity of scheduled transportation services (UK Civil Aviation Authority, 1974).
Table 1 provides a comparison of air service journey times with surface modes of
public transportation between selected locations. For example, a flight time of one
hour between Glasgow and Stornoway in the Western Isles compares to a surface
journey time on public transport services of just over eight hours involving three
6different modes, ferry, coach and rail. This serves to illustrate the significant time
advantage air services enjoy over other modes and how dependent these regions are
on air services to ensure convenient access to mainland population centres.
Due to low population density (9 persons per square kilometre compared with an EU
average of 116), economic underdevelopment and the relative inaccessibility of
communities situated in the Highlands and Islands, commercial air transport in this
region is at worst, significantly unprofitable and at best marginally economic. This
has been the situation ever since the first scheduled passenger services were
launched in the nineteen thirties. According to a 1974 UK Civil Aviation Authority
report on air services in the Highlands and Islands of Scotland (UK Civil Aviation
Authority, 1974), three out of eighteen services operated by the then Scottish
Airways generated an operating profit (Glasgow-Benbecula, Aberdeen-Wick and
Inverness-Wick). Nearly thirty years later, despite attempts during the early nineteen
eighties to rationalise services, according to Kyrou (1998), British Airways was
losing approximately US$5 million per annum on directly operating air services
between the Scottish mainland and the Northern and Western Isles.
History
The history of air transport provision in the Highlands began with the pioneering
flights during the nineteen thirties by Scottish and Highland Airways, both carriers
subsequently taken-over by British European Airways (BEA) in the late nineteen
forties. The formation of British Airways in 1974, when BEA merged with BOAC
(British Overseas Airways Corporation) had little immediate effect on the pattern of
air services. The first initiatives to rationalise air services were taken in 1981 with
7the formation of the British Airways Highland Division as a profit-centre within the
airline. These developments coincided with deregulation in the domestic market and
the emergence during the nineteen eighties and nineties of Loganair, as a rival to
British Airways in the Highlands and Islands. Competition between both carriers
lasted until 1994 when British Airways signed a franchise agreement with Loganair
and the Isle of Man-based British Regional Airlines (subsequently re-named BRAL
and then BA Citiexpress), to operate services on its behalf in the Highlands. This
initiative was firstly motivated by mounting financial losses the airline was incurring
on directly operating air services in this region, and secondly, a belief that
franchising would enable carriers better suited to operating in such an environment
to manage these services at lower cost and at the same time maintaining and in some
cases extending the British Airways brand in this market.
Current air service provision
At present all scheduled services within and to the Highlands and Islands, with the
exception of those operating between Aberdeen and Wick are operated under a
British Airways Express franchise agreement either by BA Citiexpress or Loganair.
BA Citiexpress operates services using 66-seat ATP turboprop aircraft on Aberdeen-
Sumburgh, Glasgow-Stornoway and Glasgow-Benbecula). All other routes are
operated by Loganair; using a mixture of Saab 340s (34 seats), Shorts 360s (34
seats), Twin Otters (20 seats) and Britten-Norman Islanders (10 seats). Due to low
levels of traffic, some routes are operated as multiple sectors involving intermediate
aircraft stops. For example, with regard to the two daily services between Glasgow
and Sumburgh, one involves intermediate stops at Inverness and Kirkwall and the
8other at Aberdeen. Many of these services also face competitive pressures from
subsidised passenger ferry services such as the P&O services between Aberdeen and
Scrabster to the Orkney and Shetland Islands and the state-owned Caledonian
Macbrayne services on the west coast.
The map in Figure 1 shows the present structure of the Highlands and Islands
network and Table 2 lists 2001 traffic data and weekly service frequency on each
route in June 2001.
Regulation and Subsidy Policy
The provision of air transport in the Highlands and Islands is subject to the same
licensing, safety and economic regulations that apply to other regions of the United
Kingdom and European Union. However, given the unremunerative nature of air
service provision to remote regions and driven by the political and socio-economic
need to integrate these communities, the UK government has, under Article 4 of
Regulation 2408/92 (Commission for the European Communities, 1992), imposed
public service obligations (PSO) on a number of routes within the region. Public
service obligations require a contracted air carrier to meet certain minimum service
requirements in return for financial compensation over a fixed period of time.
Public service obligations are currently on fifteen routes: Benbecula-Barra, Glasgow-
Barra, Glasgow-Campbeltown, Glasgow-Tiree, Kirkwall-Eday, Kirkwall-Sanday,
Kirkwall-Stronsay, Kirkwall-Westray, Kirkwall-Papa Westray, Kirkwall-North
Ronaldsay, Lerwick-Foula, Lerwick-Papa Stour, Lerwick-Out Skerries, Lerwick-Fair
Isle, and Stornoway-Benbecula.
9Public service obligations are administered by municipal authorities on intra–island
services in Orkney, Shetland and the Outer Hebrides while the Scottish Executive
administers public service obligations on routes from Glasgow. Orkney and
Shetland Islands Councils award annual subsidies of GBP170,000 and GBP232,000
respectively. While on Western Isles and Scottish Executive PSOs the annual
subsidy awarded is GBP282,000 and approximately GBP1,000,000 respectively.
Regulatory change and services to small communities
United States
The United States was the first country in the developed world to liberalise its
domestic scheduled airline market. The 1978 Airline Deregulation Act removed the
structure of economic controls that had regulated the provision and pricing of
scheduled air services since 1945.
By the mid to late nineteen eighties there was growing concern amongst policy-
makers in the United States that airline strategic decisions in response to new
opportunities offered by deregulation were adversely impacting the level of air
service provision to small communities. Evidence from studies undertaken during
this period identified shifts in airline operating priorities, with some carriers exiting
or reducing services within and to small community markets in favour of more
financially lucrative high-density routes. As a consequence of these developments,
many non-hub airports lost direct services. Research by Jones and Cocke (1984),
Molloy (1985) and Khil (1988), showed that the number of direct point to point
services at non-hub airports declined markedly following deregulation in 1978.
These arguments are, however, countered by Morrison and Winston (1986) and
10
Butler and Huston (1990) who claim that air service provision to non-hub airports
actually improved since deregulation. This was manifested in increased flight
frequencies on routes to small hubs and a greater range of destinations available to
passengers through hub and spoke scheduling.
Another effect of deregulation was the trend amongst carriers to down-size aircraft.
In liberalised markets, where airlines are competing for market share on the basis of
improving service frequency, load factors are optimised through reducing aircraft
size. Research by Huston and Butler (1988) showed that the percentage of
turboprops deployed on the smallest city-pair markets increased from 52% in 1976
to 91% in 1988. This points to a shift in use from jets to turboprop aircraft which
many passengers perceive as offering a lower quality of in-flight service due to
increased levels of noise and vibration compared to jet aircraft.
Europe
In the European Union, the complete liberalisation of air service markets was not
achieved until April 1997. In 2002, a licensed air carrier can legally operate between
any two airports open to scheduled services in the European Union outside routes
protected by Public Service Obligations.
Studies by the European Commission (Commission of the European Communities,
1997) and the United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority (UK Civil Aviation
Authority, 1995) have shown that air travellers within the European Union have
largely benefited from deregulation. These measures encouraged carriers to compete
with established airlines in previously oligopolistic and monopolistic city-pair
markets. Deregulation has also spawned the emergence of so called low cost “no
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frills” airlines offering a greater choice of discount fares than was previously
available. However, in evaluating the effects on a route-by-route basis, results are
disappointing with meaningful and effective head to head competition restricted to a
small number of highly trafficked city-pairs (Commission of the European
Communities 1997). In light of these conclusions, one may ask to what extent has
EU liberalisation benefited Europe’s peripheral regions where traffic levels are
significantly lower and air transport provision much more essential to the social and
economic development?
Research by Reynolds-Feighan (1995), who sought to identify the effects of
liberalisation on traffic levels at small community Irish airports, found that
liberalisation created an unstable operating environment, characterised by cyclical
and permanent reductions in air service provision. The author cites the example of
intense competition between Ryanair and Aer Lingus during the early nineteen
nineties which led to the eventual withdrawal of direct services from Irish regional
airports to both London and Dublin2. In citing this example, the author argues for a
European Union-wide essential air services programme of financial assistance along
the same lines as that in place within the United States to protect air services to small
and remote communities.
In Norway, also a country heavily dependent on air transport, domestic air service
deregulation was initiated in 1975 with the partial relaxation of market entry
restrictions and the certification of new scheduled air carriers. According to
Ludvigsen (1993), small communities benefited from these measures. This was
2 Galway, Carrickfinn, Sligo, Kerry (since re-instated) and Waterford to London and the reduction in Aer
Lingus feeder flights from these points to Dublin
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manifested in the subsequent launch of new intra and inter-regional domestic
services. The Norwegian government was restrained by socio-economic policy
considerations from undertaking a process of complete liberalisation of the domestic
market. This was due to a concern that deregulation followed by successful market
entry would undermine the geographic integrity of the SAS and Braathens S.A.F.E
air carrier networks which allowed for internal cross-subsidy between truck routes
and unprofitable services to remote communities. This ability to cross-subsidise,
therefore obviated the need for government to directly support services to airports
located in remote regions.
Franchising air services
Air service franchising has been adopted by a growing number of airlines both in
Europe and in North America over the last fifteen years. Motivated by the need to
reduce and minimise costs in a highly competitive operating environment, several
large carriers have out-sourced segments of their route networks to local franchise
operators.
Franchisee carriers, according to Denton and Dennis (2000), as well as receiving the
benefits of being aligned to the a major airline brand, are able to secure access to the
global network, computer reservation system and the frequent flier programme of the
franchiser and its other alliance partners. Franchising in Europe was pioneered by
British Airways, where under the British Airways Express brand, several United
kingdom-based carriers operate regional services on behalf of British Airways (BA
Citiexpress, Loganair). Franchising also provides an opportunity for a large airline
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to access a market at minimal cost through establishing an agreement whereby a
regional airline directly operates services on its behalf.
It is apparent that there are mutual benefits to both the franchiser and the franchisee.
However, to what extent has franchising affected the availability of convenient
services and the quality air service provision in general? One possible effect of out-
sourcing existing services to a franchise operator is that the franchise operator is
unable to match levels of in-flight service and punctuality previously set by the
franchiser. The extent to which one is able to identify if such an effect took place is
rather limited since no research has been undertaken to validate this view.
However, BRAL was heavily criticised by the North of Scotland press over poor
punctuality not long after inheriting some Scottish internal routes from British
Airways (Press and Journal, 1999).
On the other hand, it is possible that service levels in terms of increased frequency
could improve with the deployment of a more appropriate mix of aircraft. A report
published by the UK Civil Aviation Authority, on trends emerging from the single
aviation market after five years (UK Civil Aviation Authority, 1998a), showed that
markets previously not served could be served if operated by a regional franchise
carrier. Robertson (1997) in an analysis of the effects of franchising on UK
domestic routes, found that significant increases in traffic were recorded on those
routes that become franchised and that a number of city-pairs currently without a
direct service could potentially support a service if it were operated as a franchise.
Denton and Dennis (2000) in their analysis of the impact of franchising on airlines
and consumers conclude that franchising can expand the scope and provision of air
services in terms of routes to new destinations and increased frequency. However,
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the authors also note that the impact may also be averse from a consumer’s
perspective since there is evidence, validated by research undertaken by the UK
Civil Aviation Authority (UK Civil Aviation Authority, 1998a), that franchising has
reduced competition within Europe’s domestic markets while lower costs incurred
by the franchisee have yet to feed through into lower fares for the consumer.
Research Approach and Data Sources
The aim of this paper is to identify the effects of franchising, which occurred
between 1994 and 1996, on air service provision in the Highlands and Islands of
Scotland.
Analysis is based on contrasting the level and quality of service provision in 1998
and 2001 with the period 1983 to 1993 using the following measures:
 Frequency. Measures of total network frequency and average frequency per
route are obtained. Statistics are complied from the ABC/OAG World Airways
Guide for the month of June in the following years: 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998 and
2001.
 Maximum lapsed destination time. Maximum lapsed destination time (METD),
measures the total lapsed time between the earliest daily arrival time and the
latest daily departure time at a given location on a specific route. This variable
is able to measure the relative convenience of departure and arrival times from
the perspective of the day-trip passenger. Statistics were complied from the
same source as that obtained for weekly service frequency.
 Seating capacity per flight. Past research has shown that most passengers prefer
travelling on jet aircraft as opposed to turboprops and larger aircraft as opposed
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to small (Kanafani and Ghobrial, 1985, Ghobrial, 1989). Average seating
capacity per flight measures the size of aircraft deployed on a given route and is
used to identify if a specific market has experienced an increase or decrease in
average aircraft size. Statistics were complied from the same source as that
obtained for weekly service frequency.
 In-flight time. In-flight time measures the amount of time spent by a passenger
in-flight on a specific route. This is determined by published scheduled
departure and arrival times. Where there are different aircraft types deployed on
a route, an average is obtained, weighted by the service frequency associated
with each aircraft type.
Analysis will also focus on assessing changes in patterns of air services within the
context of whether franchise carriers were better able to manage capacity in relation
to traffic.
The sample of routes selected for analysis, including sector distances, are listed in
Table 4. Only those routes that were directly affected by franchising and were




One-way service frequency, aggregated across all routes, increased by a factor of 4%
between 1983 and 2001, from 133 to 138 weekly flights. According to Figure 2
average weekly frequency per route, over the same period, increased marginally
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from 11.08 to 11.50 flights per week. Average weekly frequency weighted by route
density increased from 14.04 to 14.83 services per week during the same period.
Between 1988 and 1993 there is 23% increase in weighted average frequency per
route. This is as a result of Loganair’s expansion of services between 1991 and 1993
and an increase in frequency supplied by British Airways on Aberdeen-Sumburgh,
Glasgow-Stornoway and Inverness-Stornoway.
Evaluating individual route service frequency trends in Table 5 shows that while in
some markets, service levels have largely remained unchanged over the entire
period, frequency has increased by the highest amounts on services between
Edinburgh and Kirkwall, Aberdeen and Kirkwall and Inverness and Stornoway. On
Edinburgh-Kikrwall, where most services involve an intermediate stop at either
Inverness or Wick, service frequency increased from five round-trips in 1983 to
twelve in 2001. Both markets also recorded increases in frequency between 1993 and
2001, after services were franchised. As a result of franchising the only significant
reductions in frequency between 1993 and 2002 were recorded on Glasgow-
Kirkwall, Glasgow-Stornoway and Kirkwall-Sumburgh while frequency on
Inverness-Kirkwall increased by a factor of 50% during this period
Franchising appears not to have had an adverse effect on total network service
frequency, while the decline in average frequency per route appears not to have been
significant.
However, one disadvantage in adopting frequency as a measure of the level and
quality of service is that no indication is provided as to the convenience of departure
and arrival times on a given route.
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Maximum Lapsed Destination Time (MLDT)
Schedule convenience can be measured by calculating Maximum Lapsed Destination
Time (MLDT) in both directions for each city-pair. MLTD measures the total lapsed
time between the earliest daily arrival time and the latest daily departure time at a
given location on a specific route.
Figure 3 shows that there has been a steady and consistent improvement in both
simple and weighted average MLDT over the period 1983 to 2001. Weighted
MLDT increases quite markedly from 6.06 hours in 1993 to 7.27 hours in 2001,
while the simple average increases from 5.94 hours to 6.90 hours over the same
period.
Observation of statistics listed in Table 6 shows that there is significant variation in
absolute levels of MLDT between and within city-pair markets, in the latter case
through directional differences in absolute levels and in growth rates between each
period. To a large extent, differences within and between city-pairs are as a result of
scheduling and aircraft over-night positioning decisions taken by airlines. From
1983 to 1993, there is little change in MLDT, with a few exceptions. For example,
on services from Aberdeen to Kirkwall, MLDT increases by 67%. While on services
from Inverness to Glasgow, there is a fall of 64%.
After 1993, following the franchising of air services, significant changes are
apparent across most routes up to 2001. Large increases were recorded on Inverness-
Glasgow (173%) and Stornoway-Inverness (321%). Only five out of the sixteen
directional routes recorded reductions in MLDT, Kirkwall-Aberdeen, Glasgow-
Inverness, Glasgow-Stornoway, Sumburgh-Kirkwall and Stornoway-Glasgow. The
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impact of franchising, therefore, on MLDT appears largely to have been positive.
For example, in 1993, a passenger departing from Inverness to Glasgow could only
spend a maximum of 4.25 hours in Glasgow before having to return on the last
flight. BRAL, which operated the route in 1998, restored the early morning
departure from Inverness, thus allowing passengers 11.17 hours in Glasgow.
Loganair also introduced for the first time a morning departure from Stornoway to
Inverness and an early evening return thereby increasing MLDT on Stornoway-
Inverness by 321% over the period 1993-2001
Average Seating Capacity per Flight
In the Highlands and Islands, because of low traffic volumes, all internal air services
have been and still are operated by turboprop aircraft. Figure 4 below shows that
average seating capacity per flight increased from 35.5 in June 1983 to 52.2 in June
1993. Up to 1991, British Airways services were operated by 44-seat British
Aerospace 748 turboprops. These were then replaced by 66-seat British Aerospace
ATPs. This explains the sharp increase in both simple and weighted average aircraft
size between 1988 and 1993. Rival carrier Loganair, prior to 1994, was operating a
mix of De-Havilland Twin-Otters, BAe Jetstream 31s, Shorts 360s, and Britten-
Norman islanders, all aircraft with less than forty seats.
When British Airways services were franchised to BRAL and Loganair, ten out of
the twelve routes sampled recorded a reduction in average seating capacity per flight
of between 4% and 47% between 1993 and 2001. For example, according to Table
7, average aircraft seating capacity per flight fell by 47% between 1993 and 2001 on
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services between Aberdeen and Kirkwall. This is because BRAL replaced ATP
turboprops, previously operated by British Airways, with smaller 34-seat Saab 340s.
Similar scale reductions were recorded on other routes (Kirkwall-Sumburgh,
Glasgow-Inverness) where ATP turboprops were replaced by older non-pressurised
34-seat Shorts 360 aircraft. These results suggest that service levels from the
perspective of aircraft size have declined in so far as passengers travelling within
and from the Highlands and Islands have had to endure the discomfort of not only
smaller, but in some cases, non-pressurised aircraft as a direct consequence of
franchising. However, it should be pointed out that between 1998 and 2001,
Loganair was in the process of replacing its ageing non-pressurised Shorts 360 fleet
with faster and pressurised Saab 340 turboprops.
In-flight time
Passenger’s perception of the quality of service offered in a given market is, to a
large extent, influenced by the amount of time spent in-flight between any two
airports.
Figure 5 illustrates changes in simple and weighted average in-flight time per route
between 1983 and 2001. In June 1983, average in-flight time was 0.83 hours per
route. By June 1988, this had increased marginally to 0.86 hours. As far as weighted
average in-flight time is concerned, there is no change between June 1983 and June
1988. Between 1988 and 1993, both simple and weighted average in-flight time
decline to 0.79 hours and 1.03 hours respectively.
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Up to 1993, the deployment of new and faster aircraft by both Loganair and British
Airways was largely responsible for the decline in both average and weighted
average in-flight time.
Franchising appears to have had the effect of reducing further, with the exception of
a very slight increase in the simple average between 1993 and 1998, average in-flight
time across the network. These trends occurred in spite of the fact slower Shorts 360
aircraft were being deployed in place of faster ATPs on a number of routes
(Inverness-Glasgow, Inverness-Kirkwall, Edinburgh-Kirkwall, Kirkwall-Sumburgh
and Glasgow-Kirkwall). The decline in average in-flight time is mainly due to an
increase in the number of non-stop direct flights across the network. Figure 6 shows
that the number of direct non-stop services as a percentage of total direct services
declined from 77% in June 1983 to 66% in June 1993. However, as smaller aircraft
are introduced to the network after franchising, a greater number of direct services
are introduced increasing the proportion to 85% in June 1998.
Analysis of city-pair in-flight time data listed in Table 8 illustrates the combined
effect of replacing direct with one-stop flights and vice-versa, and reducing aircraft
size on in-flight time. For example, on services between Aberdeen and Kirkwall, the
replacement of the 66-seat British Aerospace ATP with the 34-seat Saab 340
operated by BRAL did not affect in-flight time since the Saab 340, despite its lower
seating capacity, is able to match cruising speeds achieved by the ATP.
Furthermore, in 1993, five of the seventeen weekly flights between Aberdeen and
Kirkwall involved an intermediate stop in Inverness, whereas in 1998 and 2001 all
flights between both airports were non-stop.
21
In-flight time increases by the largest amount between 1993 and 2001 on Glasgow-
Kirkwall and Edinburgh-Kirkwall. Prior to franchising, Loganair operated direct
services on these routes in competition with British Airways using newly acquired
British Aerospace Jetstream 31s. However, as a result of the re-structuring that
followed the franchise agreement, both routes were eventually handed over to BRAL
in 1994 who replaced direct non-stop services with one-stop flights operated by non-
pressurised Shorts 360s involving intermediate stops at Inverness and Aberdeen. The
effect of this was to increase average in-flight time on Edinburgh and Glasgow
services respectively. However, services between Aberdeen and both Sumburgh and
Kirkwall experienced a reduction in-flight time due to the replacement of direct one-
stop with non-stop flights. Despite the substitution of ATPs with the smaller Saab
340 on the Kirkwall-Aberdeen route, there was no adverse effect on in-flight time
since the Saab 340 is able to match cruising speeds achieved by the ATP.
Franchising which coincided with the deployment of smaller aircraft on the
Highlands and Islands network appears to have been responsible for the overall
reduction in in-flight time. Before 1993, British Airways was operating 66-seat
ATP’s which could only be operated commercially on a multi-sector basis, hence the
low proportion of direct non-stop services in June 1993. However, the franchise
carriers, especially Loganair, have a more appropriate mix of equipment for the
market and were thus able to offer more direct services and a reduction in in-flight
time.
Management of supply and demand
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Without the benefit of government subsidies or cross-crediting revenue from
profitable routes, air carriers operating in low-density markets are driven by the
commercial necessity of recovering costs and generating a return on their
investment. This can pose a particular economic challenge in an environment of
comparatively high infrastructure use charges and low traffic volumes. Therefore,
an analysis of service provision would be incomplete without adequate consideration
of the management and deployment of capacity in relation to developments in the
volume of passenger traffic
Table 9 provides a breakdown of seating capacity, passenger traffic levels and
passenger load factor on routes within the Highlands and Islands. Statistics are
separated into East Coast and West Coast services. Total passenger traffic on
services in the Highlands and Islands increases from 17,821 in June 1983 to 31,053
in June 2001, an average annual growth rate of 4.1%. This compares to an average
annual growth rate of 2.7% in seating capacity. Total load factor in June 1983 was
67%, increasing to 73% in June 1988.
Between 1988 and 1993, the combined effect of additional Loganair services and the
replacement of BAe 748 turboprops with larger ATPs on the British Airways
network results in a reduction in load factor on both East and West Coast route
sectors. For example, load factor on services between the mainland (Glasgow,
Inverness) and Western Isles (Stornoway, Benbecula, Islay) declines from 65% in
June 1988 to 53% in June 1993. Load factor also falls on the East Coast route
network from 79% to 63% over the same period 3.
3 It should also be borne in mind that these statistics relate to the month of June and one would expect lower
load factors between October and March.
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What is also interesting is that levels of traffic and the deployment of capacity have
not been affected by declining population levels of some of the island communities
reported in Table 3 if one contrasts the situation in 2001 with 1983. However, it is
important to note that traffic levels on some of the mainland-western isles have
actually fallen between 1998 and 2001. For example, the total number of passengers
carried on Glasgow-Islay in 2001 was 19,609 compared to 19,914 in 1998. This
trend may be as a result of two factors; de-population or changes in service levels
and prices on competing ferry services.
Increased competition during the period 1991-1994 between British Airways and
Loganair and the deployment of large aircraft had the combined effect of creating an
environment of excess capacity. For example, Loganair introduced direct services,
for the first time between Glasgow and Kirkwall in competition with daily British
Airways services which were routed through Aberdeen and Inverness in June 1993.
However, such a strategy could not be sustained in the face of mounting financial
losses incurred by British Airways in operating services directly in the Highlands
and islands. Hence, the commercial logic in seeking to co-operate rather than
compete with rival Loganair.
Where competition, though limited, has existed before, the effect of the franchise
agreement was to make the British Airways brand dominant in the Highlands. The
franchise agreement allowed for the air carriers to establish more financially
sustainable network of services through adjustments in frequency, routings, capacity
and aircraft type. The franchise carriers were able to achieve significantly higher
load factors, 79% in June 2001 compared to 59% in June 1993. Indeed, load
factors, which had been comparatively low on west coast routes between 1983 and
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1998, had improved markedly by June 2001. The main reason for this is that
Loganair had replaced BRAL on the Inverness-Stornoway route and were offering a
reduced level of capacity (ATP’s replaced by Saab 340s) but interestingly a more
convenient schedule of services (see Table 6). What is apparent from these
developments is that the rationalisation and consolidation which was inevitable in an
environment of excess capacity, was achieved without any significant deterioration
on service levels. Indeed, many aspects of air service provision improved, such as,
the convenience of flight timings, reduced in-flight times and introduction of new
routes as a consequence of franchising.
Conclusions
Air services were franchised by British Airways in order to reduce costs and to
eliminate the mounting losses incurred in operating services directly. Franchise
carriers, through using a amore appropriate size and mix of aircraft were better able
to achieve higher load factors and a more commercial successful operation. In spite
of the fact that passengers had to endure the relative discomfort and inconvenience
of smaller aircraft as a result of downsizing, franchising has brought improved
departure and arrival times, shorter journeys, and fewer multi-stop services.
Franchising has also resulted in new routes such as Edinburgh-Stornoway and a new
direct non-stop service between Edinburgh and Sumburgh. Furthermore, the
inconvenience suffered by the travelling public as a result of having to endure non-
pressurised flight may be short lived as Loganair are in the process of deploying
additional pressurised Saab 340 aircraft.
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From the operator’s perspective the over-provision in air services that was clearly
apparent in 1993 could not be sustained and that the reduction in capacity was
necessary in an environment of low traffic volumes and high costs4. These were the
key factors that prompted British Airways to franchise its Highlands and Islands
services to BRAL and Loganair. Both airlines were better able to serve the market
through a combination of lower costs and more suitable aircraft types.
Although this paper is rather limited in its geographic scope, it has sought to
examine how franchising has impacted on the provision of air services in one of
Europe’s peripheral regions. It is also very important to point out that enhanced
service levels have been achieved without the imposition of public service
obligations with their fixed minimum levels of service and financial compensation.
However, the extension of British Airways dominant position in the Highlands and
Islands may have negative implications in that the franchise carriers who now
control almost all scheduled routes would have incentives to exercise monopoly
power through setting excessive air fares. Indeed, there has emerged anecdotal
evidence at the time of writing which appears to suggest that the level of air fares
across the Highlands and Islands air services network is perceived by the local
population to be very high (Press and Journal, 2002). While this perception in part
has been fuelled by expectations of low fares generated by low cost airlines
operating on the main trunk markets, this presents a very real problem for policy-
makers. Detailed research into the level of air fares, before and after franchising and
4 British Airways for example, was reported to have been loosing approximately US$5 million per annum on
services between the mainland and island communities.
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an analysis of the potential scope for competition would represent a very useful
contribution to the current debate on air services in the Highlands and Islands.
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Figure 2: Simple and weighted *average weekly service frequency (one-way) per
route: 1983 –2001
* Average weighted by route traffic density
Sources: ABC (1983, 1988a, 1988b, 1993a, 1993b),
OAG (1998a, 1998b, 2001)
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Figure 3: Simple and weighted* average MLDT(in hours) per route: 1983 – 2001
Average weighted by route traffic density
Sources: ABC (1983, 1988a, 1988b, 1993a, 1993b),
OAG (1998a, 1998b, 2001)
33
Figure 4: Simple and weighted* Average Aircraft Seat capacity per flight per route:
1983 – 2001
* Average weighted by route traffic density
Sources: ABC (1983, 1988a, 1988b, 1993a, 1993b),
OAG (1998a, 1998b, 2001)
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Figure 5: Simple and weighted* average in-flight time (in hours) per route: 1983-2001
* Average weighted by route traffic density
Sources: ABC (1983, 1988a, 1988b, 1993a, 1993b),
OAG (1998a, 1998b, 2001)
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Figure 6: Direct non-stop services as a % of total direct services* 1983, 1988, 1993,
1998, 2001
* Total direct = non-stop, one-stop and multi-stop
Sources: ABC (1983, 1988a, 1988b, 1993a, 1993b),
OAG (1998a, 1998b, 2001)
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Table 1: Air and surface journey times on selected city-pair markets (in hours): June
2001
Air Surface
Rail Sea Coach Total
Stornoway-Glasgow1 1.0 4.2 2.6 1.3 8.1
Orkney-Inverness 2 0.9 0.7 4.1 4.8
Shetland-Aberdeen 3 1.0 14.0 14.0
Wick-Aberdeen 4 0.8 6.4 6.4
1
Surface transport alternative for Glasgow-Stornoway is: Glasgow-Inverness (rail), Inverness-Ullapool (Coach), Ullapool-Stornoway (ferry)
2
Surface transport alternatives for Orkney-Inverness is: Kirkwall-Burwick (Bus), Burwick-John O’Groats (Ferry), John O’Groats-Inverness
(Coach)
3
Surface transport alternatives for Shetland-Aberdeen is: Lerwick-Aberdeen (ferry)
4
Surface transport alternatives for Wick-Aberdeen is: Wick-Inverness-Aberdeen (Rail)
Sources: ABC (1983, 1988a, 1988b, 1993a, 1993b) Cityline Scotland (2002, Railtrack (2002), P&O Scottish Ferries (2002)
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Table 2: Total scheduled passenger traffic (2001) and weekly service frequency (June
2001) by route























Source: UK Civil Aviation Authority (2001)
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Table 3: Population Statistics: sample airport catchment areas 1991, 1998
Regions Airport 1981 1991 2000* 1981-00 %
change
Lewis & Harris Stornoway 22,485 21,737 20,925 -6.9%
North & South Uist Benbecula 3,630 3,510 3,646 -0.4%
Orkney Kirkwall 18,419 19,612 19,480 5.7%
Shetland Sumburgh 22,768 22,522 22,440 -1.4%
Islay Islay 3,792 3,538 3,260 -14.0%
Tiree Tiree 760 768 698 -8.2%
Barra Barra 1,264 1,244 1,211 -4.2%
* mid-year estimates
Source: General Register Office for Scotland (2002)
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Table 5: Weekly service frequency (one-way) by route in June: 1983. 1988, 1993, 1998,
2001




Aberdeen-Kirkwall 11 16 17 20 18 64% 6%
Aberdeen-Sumburgh 23 18 25 24 22 -4% -12%
Edinburgh-Kirkwall 5 11 6 5 12 140% 100%
Edinburgh-Wick 5 11 6 6 6 20% 0%
Glasgow-Benbecula 6 7 6 6 6 0% 0%
Glasgow-Inverness 23 11 14 13 16 -30% 14%
Glasgow-Islay 9 11 11 11 11 22% 0%
Glasgow-Kirkwall 6 5 21 7 6 0% -71%
Glasgow-Stornoway 11 12 17 14 12 9% -29%
Inverness-Kirkwall 15 16 8 10 12 -20% 50%
Inverness-Stornoway 8 8 11 12 11 38% 0%
Kirkwall-Sumburgh 11 11 8 7 6 -45% -25%
Sources: ABC (1983, 1988a, 1988b, 1993a, 1993b), OAG
(1998a, 1998b, 2001)
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Table 6: Maximum Lapsed Destination Time in hours (MLDT) by route in June:
1983,1988,1993,1998, 2001
June 1983 June 1988 June 1993 June 1998 June 2001 1993-2001
Sumburgh-Aberdeen 6.83 6.50 7.17 9.50 9.58 34%
Aberdeen-Sumburgh 6.17 5.25 5.58 6.33 6.25 12%
Kirkwall-Aberdeen 6.83 6.92 7.17 6.75 6.00 -16%
Aberdeen-Kirkwall 3.58 4.25 6.00 9.25 9.25 54%
Inverness-Glasgow 11.92 11.08 4.25 11.17 11.58 173%
Glasgow-Inverness 7.83 7.25 9.58 8.33 7.42 -23%
Glasgow-Islay 7.58 7.25 7.33 8.58 8.33 14%
Islay-Glasgow 5.92 5.50 5.58 6.58 6.33 13%
Glasgow-Stornoway 3.42 3.83 7.42 3.17 6.92 -7%
Stornoway-Glasgow 5.42 5.50 4.50 4.67 3.83 -15%
Inverness-Kirkwall 3.67 4.25 4.33 5.83 5.25 21%
Kirkwall-Inverness 6.25 5.92 5.92 8.83 9.50 61%
Kirkwall-Sumburgh 1.33 1.08 1.25 4.42 4.42 253%
Sumburgh-Kirkwall 9.75 10.25 9.92 0.00 0.00 -100%
Inverness-Stornoway 8.25 8.42 7.42 7.92 9.00 21%
Stornoway-Inverness 1.17 1.08 1.58 0.58 6.67 321%
Sources: ABC (1983, 1988a, 1988b, 1993a, 1993b),
OAG (1998a, 1998b, 2001)
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Table 7: Average seating capacity per flight by route: 1983. 1988, 1993, 1998, 2001
June 1983 June 1988 June 1993 June 1998 June 2001 % change
1993-01
Aberdeen-Kirkwall 44 44 64 35 34 -47%
Aberdeen-Sumburgh 44 44 64 61 62 -4%
Edinburgh-Kirkwall 20 35 36 34 34 -6%
Edinburgh-Wick 20 35 36 34 34 -6%
Glasgow-Benbecula 44 44 64 66 66 3%
Glasgow-Inverness 28 33 53 36 34 -36%
Glasgow-Islay 20 20 36 34 34 -6%
Glasgow-Kirkwall 44 44 37 39 34 -8%
Glasgow-Stornoway 44 66 64 63 66 3%
Inverness-Kirkwall 30 24 45 34 34 -24%
Inverness-Stornoway 44 44 64 63 34 -47%
Kirkwall-Sumburgh 44 44 64 39 34 -47%
Sources: ABC (1983, 1988a, 1988b, 1993a, 1993b), OAG (1998a, 1998b,
2001)
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Table 8: Average in-flight time (in hours) by route: 1983. 1988, 1993, 1998, 2001
June 1983 June 1988 June 1993 June 1998 June 2001 % change
1993-01
Aberdeen-Kirkwall 0.75 1.10 0.99 0.75 0.83 -16%
Aberdeen-Sumburgh 1.49 1.34 1.13 1.00 1.00 -12%
Edinburgh-Kirkwall 1.83 2.18 1.46 2.01 1.77 21%
Edinburgh-Wick 1.33 1.58 1.01 1.17 1.08 7%
Glasgow-Benbecula 1.00 0.92 1.00 1.00 1.00 -
Glasgow-Inverness 0.67 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.67 14%
Glasgow-Islay 0.83 0.79 1.12 0.90 0.89 -21%
Glasgow-Kirkwall 2.08 2.00 1.38 2.02 2.14 54%
Glasgow-Stornoway 1.08 1.09 1.27 1.13 1.00 -21%
Inverness-Kirkwall 0.95 1.01 0.67 0.88 0.75 13%
Inverness-Stornoway 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 -
Kirkwall-Sumburgh 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.67 0.67 14%
Sources: ABC (1983, 1988a, 1988b, 1993a, 1993b), OAG (1998a, 1998b, 2001)
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Table 9: Passenger traffic, capacity and load factors by route sector in the month of
June: 1983. 1988, 1993, 1998, 2001
June 1983 June 1988 June 1993 June 1998 June 2001
Passenger Traffic
East Coast 1 11,858 12,406 16,526 19,465 21,909
West Coast 2 5,963 7,908 9,336 9,991 9,144
Total 17,821 20,314 25,862 29,456 31,053
Total seating capacity
East Coast 1 16,192 15,712 26,256 24,960 26,896
West Coast 2 10,240 12,192 17,504 19,064 12,496
Total 26,432 27,904 43,760 44,024 39,392
Load Factor
East Coast 1 73% 79% 63% 78% 81%
West Coast 2 58% 65% 53% 52% 73%
Total 67% 73% 59% 67% 79%
1 includes all services between Aberdeen and Orkney and Shetland in addition to all
routes between Glasgow / Inverness and Orkney and Shetland
2 includes all services between the Scottish mainland and the Western Isles
Sources: ABC (1983, 1988a, 1988b, 1993a, 1993b), OAG (1998a, 1998b, 2001)
